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Abstract
We use a version of the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) developed at the ECB in order
to quantify the gains from monetary policy cooperation. The model is calibrated in order
to match a set of empirical moments. We then derive the cooperative and (open-loop) Nash
monetary policies, assuming that the central banks’ objectives is to maximize the welfare of the
households. Our results show that given the current degree of openness of the US and euro area
economies, the gains from monetary policy coordination are small, amounting to 0.03 percent
of steady-state consumption. Nevertheless, the gains appear to be sensitive to the degree of
openness and further economic integration between the two regions could generate sizable gains
from cooperation. For example, increasing the trade shares to 32 percent of GDP in both
regions, the gains from cooperation rise to about 1 percent of steady-state consumption. By
decomposing the sources of the gains from cooperation with respect to the various shocks, we
show that mark-up shocks are the most important source for gains from international monetary
policy cooperation.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, F41, F42.
Keywords: New Area Wide Model; international policy coordination; DSGE; two-country
model.5
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Non-technical summary
In this paper we quantify the gains from international monetary policy cooperation using
a simpliﬁed version of the New Area-Wide Model of the European Central Bank, designed
to describe the salient features of the euro-area and the US economies.
Following most of the existing literature, we deﬁne cooperation as the case in which
the central banks’ objective is to maximize the population-weighted sum of the euro area
and US aggregate of the utility function of each household living in the two countries. As
for the non-cooperative scenario, we consider two cases. In the ﬁrst, we assume that each
central bank maximizes the aggregate welfare of its own country under the constraint
that the other central bank can set the entire future path of its own instrument freely
(being it either money supply or the interest rate). In the second case, we explore the
welfare implications of assuming that each central bank announces a linear interest rate
rule. Then, each of the banks maximizes the aggregate welfare of its own country under
the constraint that the other central bank can choose freely the coeﬃcients of its policy
rule. In all cases we assume that the central banks can credibly commit to follow the
announced strategies.
We ﬁnd that given the current degree of openness of the euro area and the US, the
gains from international monetary policy cooperation are very small, amounting to about
0.03 percent of the output that households would consume in an economy not subjected
to stochastic ﬂuctuations. Nevertheless, our exercise also suggests that the gains from
cooperation are very sensitive to the degree of openness. For example, if the share of
export and import of the two regions would increase to about one third of domestic GDP,
the gains would increase to about 1 percent of steady-state consumption. Furthermore, we
show that the most important exogenous shocks generating these results are the cost-push
shocks, i.e. ﬂuctuations in the net mark-up of the ﬁrms.
We obtain these results with a large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model (DSGE) that displays many frictions deemed important in accounting for a num-
ber of empirical stylized facts. In particular, we assume that prices and wages adjust at
irregular intervals of time to their eﬃcient level, although they are partially indexed to
past inﬂation. In order to account for the less than full pass-through of the exchange rate,
we also assume that the import sector is unable to set prices optimally in each period.
Households have persistent consumption habits, so that consumption reacts sluggishly to
exogenous disturbances. A similar behavior is assumed for investment. The international
ﬁnancial market is assumed to be imperfect, so that net-asset positions are denominated
in one currency only. The ﬁscal authorities in the euro area and the US are assumed to
run a balanced budget and to ﬁnance their consumption needs via distortionary taxes and
lump-sum taxes. Finally, in the calibration, the monetary policies of the euro area and
the US are described by an interest rate rule, linking the interest rate to inﬂation and
output.6
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The model is calibrated to reproduce the main stylized facts discussed in the interna-
tional macroeconomics literature. In particular, we calibrate the stochastic shocks to be
consistent with the existing empirical evidence on the relative role of demand vs. sup-
ply shocks as well as on the relative role of productivity vs. non-productivity shocks in
the business cycle. This point is specially important, as we try to identify the major
exogenous sources of the gains from cooperation. In this way, for example, we are able
to show that productivity shocks do not generate large gains from cooperation, although
they are the single most important source of volatility of the real variables. Exogenous
disturbances to the net mark-up of the ﬁrms, on the contrary, can explain up to about 50
percent of the volatility of inﬂation and turns out to be also the single most important
source of gains from cooperation. This result is consistent with the view that the gains
from cooperation are mainly linked to the eﬀect of relative price changes on welfare: i.e.
the “beggar-thy-neighbor” eﬀect of induced terms of trade variations.
Our exercise is reminiscent of a similar experiment carried out by Oudiz and Sachs
(1984) more than 20 years ago with large structural models used at the Federal Reserve
Bank of the United States and at the Bank of Japan. They reached the conclusion that,
given the small degree of trade linkages between the US and the other large economies,
the gains from international monetary policy cooperation were very small. More recent
advances in macroeconomic modelling and in policy analysis have suggested new poten-
tial sources of international policy interdependence. In particular, agent’s behavior is
more solidly microfounded and driven by a rational reaction to uncertainty. Most of the
attempts to quantify the gains from cooperation using current generation models have
concluded that the gains are very small. Nevertheless it has also been pointed out that
the gains are very sensitive to the parametrization of the model and, hence, results should
derive from sound empirical evidence.
Our paper is a ﬁrst attempt to quantify the gains from cooperation in a large open-
economy model consistent with many empirical stylized facts. A number of important
issues have not been considered in our work and are left for future research. In particular,
the role of ﬁnancial market frictions in determining the degree of monetary policy inter-
dependence is neglected in this work, as in the existing literature, and could represent
an important source of non-trivial gains from cooperation. Finally, the need to correct
structural imbalances and market ineﬃciencies might generate scope for cooperation, at
least in the transition period. Research on the gains from cooperation in the face of these
problems would certainly be welcome.7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 858
January 2008
1 Introduction
The analysis of the implications of international economic interdependencies for the gains
from cross-country cooperation between monetary authorities has a long history. More
than three decades ago, Hamada (1976) recognized that “[m]ost traditional approaches
do not seem to pay due attention to the interdependent nature of monetary policies”.
Hamada’s seminal paper has spurred a large literature addressing this issue using a variety
of models, methodologies and game-theoretic concepts. The literature of the 1980s (e.g.
Canzoneri and Gray (1985) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1992)) has shown that the
potential gains from cooperation are proportional to the size of the international policy
spillovers and these, in turn, depend on the parameter values of the model. Since then,
open economy models have changed considerably calling for a reconsideration of the earlier
wisdom. In particular, eﬀorts to give stronger micro-foundations to the parameters of
the model have resulted in the so-called New Open-Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM)
literature (Lane, 2001). Using a stylized representative NOEM model, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2002) came to the conclusion that the gains from cooperation are at best very small.
However, Canzoneri et al. (2002) pointed out that the NOEM literature, per se, does
not imply that self-oriented policymaking should be recommended. The results, once
more, strongly depend on the value of some crucial parameters (see also Benigno (2002)
and Sutherland (2004) on this point). Moreover, Benigno and Benigno (2006) argued
that the gains from cooperation are also crucially dependent on the sources of the shocks
aﬀecting the economy, again a ﬁnding that was also true in the earlier literature. There
is therefore a need to move away from the stylized NOEM models and consider richer
models with a variety of shocks and frictions that have been calibrated or estimated to
match international business cycle properties. In the end, whether the potential gains
from cooperation are large or small is an empirical question. In this paper, we attempt
to move in that direction and therefore to close the circle with papers like Oudiz and
Sachs (1984) two decades ago, that addressed similar issues using traditional large-scale
models.1 Two main diﬀerences with this older literature are that our analysis does not
impose certainty equivalence and that the welfare measure is based on the preferences of
the agents.
In order to quantify the gains from cooperation, we use a version of the New Area-Wide
Model (NAWM) developed at the ECB. The NAWM is a two-region Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that is calibrated to represent the euro area (EA)
and US economies. The version used in this paper is a simpliﬁed version of the model
presented in Coenen et al. (2007), which has been re-calibrated in order to capture a
number of empirical stylized facts. It contains nominal and real frictions such as nominal
stickiness and indexation in intermediate goods prices, wages and import prices, monop-
1De Fiore and Lombardo (2007) perform a similar analysis in a three-country DSGE model with trade in
oil. They also ﬁnd that the gains from cooperation are small.8
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olistic competition in goods and labor markets, habit formation, investment adjustment
costs, home bias in consumption and incomplete international ﬁnancial markets. In addi-
tion, it features a number of diﬀerent sources of shocks including technology, labor supply,
investment, preference, mark-up and exchange rate shocks.
We then use the model to derive the welfare-based optimal monetary policy under
cooperation and under a particular deﬁnition of an open-loop Nash equilibrium. In this
context, our paper relates to the literature that addresses optimal monetary and/or ﬁscal
policy in DSGE models with steady-state distortions, such as in Benigno and Woodford
(2004a,b) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a,b, 2007a). We carry out a similar welfare-
based optimal monetary policy analysis in a medium-scale two-country open-economy
model, thereby complementing the analytical results in a very stylized version of a sim-
ilar model in Clarida et al. (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2002). In the benchmark
Cournot-Nash game, we assume that each central bank takes the money growth path of the
foreign central bank as given. However, we also discuss alternative choices of instruments
and present results based on simple interest-rate feedback rules.
Three conclusions of our benchmark analysis are worth highlighting. First, we show
that the gains from cooperation are very sensitive to the degree of international economic
integration. Given the current degree of openness of the US and euro area economies, and
in line with the recent literature, we ﬁnd that the gains from cooperation are small. They
amount to about 0.03 percent of steady-state consumption. This is an order of magnitude
higher than the gains suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), but nevertheless very
small. Allowing for stronger economic integration between the two regions can bring about
sizable gains from cooperation. For example, when the share of import in GDP is increased
from 10-15 percent to about 32 percent in both regions, the gains from cooperation rise
to about 1 percent of steady-state consumption. Second, by decomposing the sources of
the gains from cooperation with respect to the various shocks, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings of
Benigno and Benigno (2006) that the mark-up shocks can bring about larger gains from
cooperation. Overall, the gains from cooperation are an order of magnitude larger for the
mark-up shocks than for each of the other shocks we consider. This may reﬂect the fact
that those shocks are the most important source of inﬂation variability in the economy
and that they are the most problematic for the monetary authorities in terms of creating
policy trade-oﬀs. Third, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to various key
parameters of the model and ﬁnd that the gains from cooperation become considerably
larger when prices in the domestic intermediate goods sector become less sticky. With
respect to most other parameters that we investigate, the gains from cooperation remain
very small. For example, in line with the results of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), we ﬁnd
that complete international ﬁnancial markets further reduce the gains from cooperation.
It is also worth mentioning that in the benchmark model the gains from cooperation
are quite symmetric. However, this result appears to be quite sensitive to the precise
calibration of the model.9
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Not surprisingly, the discussion of the results of alternative assumptions regarding the
strategy space, i.e. the open-loop Nash game and the simple closed-loop interest-rate
feedback Nash games, highlights that the size of the gains from cooperation depends very
much on the deﬁnition of the non-cooperative game. However, we argue that for the most
reasonable deﬁnitions, the conclusions highlighted above hold.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the main structure
of the two-region DSGE model. Section 3 discusses its calibration. Section 4 presents
the two monetary policy games we study. Section 5 discusses the main results. Section
6 discusses the gains from cooperation when central banks follow simple feedback rules.
Section 7 contains the conclusions.
2 A Two Region DSGE Model
As discussed in the introduction, the model we use to investigate the gains from inter-
national monetary policy cooperation is a simpliﬁed version of the NAWM discussed in
Coenen et al. (2007). In particular, relative to Coenen et al. (2007) three main diﬀerences
are worth mentioning. First, it has only one type of representative household for each
country. Second, the ﬁscal sector is simpliﬁed by assuming the budget is balanced at
all times. And, third, there are no import adjustment costs. These simpliﬁcations were
mainly done for computational reasons.
Nevertheless, in order to investigate the interaction between market imperfections and
the gains of cooperation, the model consists of several real and nominal frictions. In
particular, the domestic goods and import sector as well as the labor market are subject
to monopolistic competition and staggered price and wage setting, respectively. Notice
that we only allow for a stochastic mark-up in the domestic goods market. Furthermore,
we also assume incomplete international asset markets in order the investigate the impact
of imperfect risk-sharing on the gains of cooperation.
The model consists of two symmetric regions of normalized population size s and 1−s,
respectively the euro area (EA), denoted as home country, and the United States.2 In
each country, there are four types of economic agents: households, ﬁrms, a ﬁscal authority,
and a monetary authority.
In the following, we outline the behavior of the diﬀerent types of agents and state
the market clearing conditions and resource constraints which need to be satisﬁed in
equilibrium. We focus on the exposition of the home country, with the understanding
that the foreign country is similarly characterized. To the extent needed, foreign variables
2The model builds on recent advances in developing micro-founded DSGE models suitable for quantitative
policy analysis, as exempliﬁed by the closed-economy model of the euro area by Smets and Wouters (2003), the
International Monetary Fund’s Global Economy Model (GEM; Bayoumi et al. (2001)) or the Federal Reserve
Board’s new open economy model named SIGMA (Erceg et al., 2006).10
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and parameters are indexed with an asterisk, ‘∗’.
2.1 Households























 1−ψ  
,
(1)
where Ci,t is a consumption index, Ni,t denotes labor services (diﬀerentiated across House-
holds) and Mi,t are nominal money balances. β is the discount factor, σ denotes the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ζ is the inverse of the elasticity of work
eﬀort with respect to the real wage. The parameter κ measures the degree of habit for-
mation in consumption, and εC
t and εN
t are AR(1) preference and labor supply shocks,
respectively. Thus, the utility of the household depends positively on the quasi-diﬀerence
between current and lagged individual consumption, and negatively on individual labor
supply. Money is introduced in the utility function in order to obtain a money demand
equation (used for monetary policy as described below). The inverse of the interest rate
elasticity of money is denoted by ψ and the weight of money balances in the utility func-
tion is denoted by εM.P t is the consumption price index (CPI), deﬁned later. Following
most of the open-economy related literature (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002)) we assume
that the weight of real balances in the household preferences is negligible (i.e. εM → 0).
Households face the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + τC
t )Pt Ci,t + Pt Ii,t + R−1
t Bi,t+1 + Mi,t+1 + ((1 − ΓBF(BF
t ))RF,t)−1St BF
i,t+1
=( 1 − τN
t )Wi,t Ni,t + RK,t Ki,t + Di,t + Ti,t + Bi,t + St BF
i,t + Mi,t,
where Rt and RF
t denote the risk-less returns on domestic bonds and internationally traded
bonds, respectively. Internationally traded bonds are denominated in foreign currency
and, thus, their domestic value depends on the nominal exchange rate St (expressed in
terms of units of home currency per unit of foreign currency). Ni,t denotes the labor
services provided to ﬁrms at wage rate Wi,t,a n dRK,t indicates the rental rate for the
capital services rented to ﬁrms Ki,t,a n dDi,t are the dividends paid by household-owned
ﬁrms from the domestic production and import sector. Furthermore, we have introduced





t ) represents a ﬁnancial intermediation premium that households
must pay when taking a position in the international bond market. The premium is a func-11
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tion of the aggregate net-foreign asset position of the country and not of the single house-
hold’s position. Finally, it is implicitly assumed that households hold state-contingent
securities. These securities are traded amongst households and provide insurance against
individual wage-income risk. This guarantees that the marginal utility of consumption
out of wage income is identical across individual household. As a result, all household will
choose identical allocations in equilibrium (for simplicity these securities are not shown).
The capital stock owned by households evolves according to the following capital
accumulation equation,
Ki,t+1 =( 1− δ)Ki,t +( 1− ΓI(εI
tIi,t/Ii,t−1))Ii,t,
where δ is the depreciation rate and ΓI(εI
tIi,t/Ii,t−1) is the adjustment cost function for-




Deﬁning as Λt/Pt and Λt Qt the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget con-
straint and the capital accumulation equation, respectively, the ﬁrst-order conditions for
maximizing the household member’s lifetime utility function with respect to Ci,t, Ii,t,
Ki,t+1, Bi,t+1, BF
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where Λt is the marginal utility of consumption; Qt measures the shadow price of a unit
of the investment good (Tobin’s Q)a n dεUIP
t stands for a white noise UIP shock.
Wage Setting
Households act as wage setters for their diﬀerentiated labor services Ni,t in monopolisti-
cally competitive markets. We assume that the wages for the diﬀerentiated labor services,
˜ Wt, are determined by staggered nominal wage contracts ` a la Calvo (1983). Thus, house-
holds receive permission to optimally reset their nominal wage contract in a given period
t with probability 1 − ξW. All household members that receive permission to reset their
wage contract choose the same wage rate ˜ Wt. Those households that do not receive per-








where parameter χW measures the degree of indexation to past changes in the price level
Pt and π is the steady-state inﬂation, and i is the index of an individual household.
Households that receive permission to optimally reset their wage contracts in period
t are assumed to maximize lifetime utility, as represented by equation (1), taking into
account the wage-indexation scheme and the demand for their labor services (the formal
derivation of which we postpone until we consider the ﬁrms’ problem).











Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal wage-setting deci-























This expression states that in those labor markets in which wage contracts are re-
optimized, the latter are set so as to equate the household’ discounted sum of expected
after-tax marginal revenues to the discounted sum of expected marginal disutility of labor.
2.2 Firms
There are three types of ﬁrms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive domestic
ﬁrms, each of which produces a single tradable diﬀerentiated intermediate good, Yf,t,a13
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monopolistically competitive import sector receiving foreign goods “at the dock”, and a
set of representative ﬁrms, which combine purchases of domestically-produced interme-
diate goods with purchases of imported intermediate goods into a distinct non-tradable
intermediate good Qf,t. All ﬁrms are indexed by f ∈ [0,1].
2.2.1 Intermediate-Goods Firms
Each intermediate-good ﬁrm f produces its diﬀerentiated output using a Cobb-Douglas
technology,




utilizing as inputs homogeneous private capital services, Kf,t, that are rented from house-
holds in fully competitive markets, and labor services, Nt. The productivity processes,
zt and z∗
t , are assumed to follow a symmetric bivariate ﬁrst-order autoregressive process
deﬁning global productivity with cross-correlated innovations, as in Backus and Crucini
(2000).
Capital and Labor Inputs
Taking the rental cost of capital RK,t and wage Wt as given, the ﬁrm’s optimal demand for
capital and labor services must solve the problem of minimizing total input cost RK,tKf,t+
Wt Nf,t subject to the technology constraint (3).
Deﬁning as MCf,t the Lagrange multiplier associated with the technology constraint
(3), the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s cost minimization problem with respect to












t )MCf,t = Wt, (5)
where τ
f
t is a stochastic (i.i.d.) subsidy to ﬁrms. We introduce this subsidy ` al aB e n i g n o
and Benigno (2006) in order to generate cost-push shocks.3 In what follows we refer to
this shock as a mark-up shock.
The Lagrange multiplier MCf,t measures the nominal marginal cost. We note that,
since all ﬁrms f face the same input prices and since they all have access to the same
production technology, nominal marginal costs MCf,t are identical across ﬁrms; that is,
MCf,t = MCt
3Often cost-push shocks are modelled as stochastic elasticity of substitution between goods (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2003). Such an assumption generates ﬁrm-speciﬁc pricing equations when solved to higher orders of
approximation, making the model intractable.14
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Price Setting
Each ﬁrm f sells its diﬀerentiated output Hf,t in the domestic markets or to foreign
importers (the demand of which is denoted by Xf,t+k) under monopolistic competition
and there is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price contracts ` a la Calvo (1983).
Accordingly, ﬁrm f receives permission to optimally reset its price in a given period t
with probability 1 − ξH.
Deﬁning as PH,f,t the price of good f, all ﬁrms that receive permission to reset their
price contracts in a given period t choose the same price. Those ﬁrms which do not receive







that is, the price contracts are indexed to a convex combination of past changes in the
aggregate price index, PH,t , and the steady-state inﬂation rate, π,w h e r eχH is a constant
indexation weight.
Each ﬁrm f receiving permission to optimally reset its price in period t maximizes the











subject to the price-indexation scheme and taking as given the aggregate domestic (Ht)
and foreign (Xt) demand for home-produced goods and subject to an elastic demand for







Here, Λt,t+k is the ﬁrm’s discount rate deﬁned as the households’ real discount factor,
while DH,f,t =( PH,f,t − MCt)Yf,t are period-t nominal proﬁts.
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition characterizing the ﬁrm’s optimal




























This expressions state that in those intermediate-good markets in which price contracts
are re-optimized, the latter are set so as to equate the ﬁrms’ discounted sum of expected
revenues to the discounted sum of expected marginal cost.15
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2.2.2 Import sector
In this section, we discuss brieﬂy the optimization problem of the local importers who
import foreign goods for which the law of one price holds, that is PD
IM,f,t = StPF,f,t as
discussed in Monacelli (2005). Note PD
IM,f,t is the “price at the dock ” of the imported
good f, where perfect pass-through still holds. Imperfect exchange rate pass-through,
however, is ensured via nominal rigidities in the import sector. This feature implies a
deviation from both extreme assumptions on import pricing namely local versus producer
currency pricing that characterize a wide array of the papers in the New Open Economy
Macroeconomics literature. The empirical evidence appears to be in favor of the chosen
speciﬁcation implying that the degree of pass-through is partial in the short-run but
complete in the long-run, as demonstrated for example by Campa and Goldberg (2002).
In contrast to Monacelli (2005), however, in our set-up imported, diﬀerentiated inter-
mediate goods are combined at the dock to a composite of imported goods at the dock







Price adjustment in the import sector is also sluggish due to staggered price contracts ` a
























IM,t is the price of the composite of the inﬁnite number of imported intermediate
goods “at the dock”, θIM is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent types of im-
ported goods, and ˜ PIM,t is the price chosen by importers that receive permission to reset
their price contracts in a given period t. Note also that the Calvo-parameter ξIM can be
interpreted as the degree of exchange rate pass-through in the model.
2.2.3 Final-Good Firms
The representative ﬁnal-good ﬁrm (we neglect the indexation in what follows) produces
the non-tradable intermediate good, Qt, combines purchases of a bundle of domestically-
produced intermediate goods, Ht, with purchases of a bundle of goods from the import

















Working Paper Series No 858
January 2008
where the parameter μ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the
distinct bundles of domestic and imported goods, while ν ∈ (0, 1)isameasureofhome
bias in the production of the intermediate good. The demand function for domestic






















Note that we assume implicitly that the share of foreign goods in investment, con-
sumption and government spending are the same, and that there are no diﬀerences in the
corresponding price indices of the variables.
2.3 Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
The ﬁscal authority purchases the ﬁnal good, Gt, and levies lump sum taxes Tt and
distortionary taxes (subsidies) on households (ﬁrms). The ﬁscal authority’s period-by-
period budget constraint then has the following form:
Pt Gt = Tt + τC
t Pt Ct + τN
t Wt Nt + τ
f
t Dt.
In the benchmark New Area-Wide Model the monetary authority is assumed to follow a
Taylor-type interest-rate rule (Taylor, 1993) speciﬁed in terms of consumer-price inﬂation
and output,








+ φgY Yt + εR,t,
where R = β−1 Π is the equilibrium nominal interest rate, Π denotes the monetary au-
thority’s inﬂation target and the term εR,t represents a serially uncorrelated monetary
policy shock.
2.4 Aggregation and Aggregate Resource Constraint
The model is closed by imposing market clearing conditions and formulating the aggregate
resource constraint.17
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With households setting their wage contracts Wt according to the described scheme, the
aggregate wage index evolves according to
Wt =
 










With intermediate-good ﬁrms f setting their price contracts for the diﬀerentiated products
sold domestically, PH,f,t, according to the described scheme, the aggregate nominal price
index evolves according to
PH,t =
 






 1−θ  1
1−θ
.
Similarly, the import prices PIM,t evolve according to:
PIM,t =
 










2.4.2 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The imposed market-clearing conditions imply the following aggregate resource constraint:
1  
0
Pf,tYf,t = PtCt + PtIt + Pt Gt + TBt,
where TBt = PH,t Xt − PD
IM,tIMt is the home country’s trade balance.
Given the aggregate resource constraint, the domestic holdings of internationally
traded bonds (that is, the home country’s (net) foreign assets), denominated in foreign








Overall, the model contains six domestic sources of stochastic shocks in each country:
a productivity, an investment, a preference, a labor supply, a mark-up and a monetary
policy shock. In addition, there is a white-noise exchange rate shock (UIP) which results
from variations in the costs of international ﬁnancial intermediation. As mentioned earlier,
the home and foreign productivity shocks are assumed to be partially cross-correlated.18
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3 Calibration
In order to be able to derive realistic empirical estimates of the gains from cooperation,
ideally we would want to have an estimated version of the two-region model discussed
above. In the absence of such an estimated version, we have applied three diﬀerent criteria
for parametrizing the model.4 First, our intention was to keep the impulse response
functions of the model close to the extended NAWM as described in Coenen et al. (2007).
Therefore, we have left some of the parameters that are key in determining the dynamics
of the model close to their values chosen in the NAWM. Second, we set the properties of
the shocks and the parameter values of the model such as i) to replicate the volatility and
correlations of some relevant variables such as output, consumption and investment and ii)
to generate realistic contributions of structural shocks to the variances of key endogenous
variables. One benchmark in this respect is de Walque et al. (2005).
We set the size of the home country to 0.43 corresponding to the size of the euro area’s
GDP relative to the US GDP. The home bias in the euro area is set to 0.85 and in the
U.S. to 0.9 reﬂecting the fact that the euro area is relatively more open than the US.
We have set the habit persistence parameter in both countries to 0.6, which is in line
with a weighted average of estimates reported by Schorfheide and Lubik (2005) and de
de Walque et al. (2005). The elasticity of labor supply is set to 2.5 in both countries. The
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ is set to 2.5 in the euro area and
to 2 in the US, reﬂecting the observed relatively higher interest-rate sensitivity in the US.
The technology parameter α is set in both countries to 0.36, while the parameters
determining the adjustment costs in investment are calibrated to 1.3 in the euro area and
1.1 in the US, reﬂecting the lower investment volatility in the euro area data. At the same
time, the parameter shaping the premium on foreign bond holdings equals 0.001. In both
countries, we set the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent types of intermediate and
imported goods to 6, while the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent labor types
equals 3. Furthermore, in order to match the negative correlation between output and
the trade balance in the data, we have calibrated the elasticity of substitution between
home and imported goods to 0.7. Price and wage indexation are equal in both countries
and are set to 0.6, while the Calvo probabilities in the domestic intermediate goods and
import sector as well as in the labor market are set to 0.7 in line with the estimates of
Schorfheide and Lubik (2005) and de Walque et al. (2005). Finally, the simple monetary
policy rule is calibrated as follows. We set the degree of interest rate smoothing at 0.7,
the interest rate response to inﬂation at 1.7, and the interest rate response to output at
0.1, in both countries.
4In developing the NAWM a two-track strategy is followed. A relatively large calibrated two-country version
is used for policy analysis (as in Coenen et al. (2007)). A simpliﬁed estimated version is used for projections (see
Christoﬀel et al., 2007). The estimated version is still in development and treats the foreign block as exogenous
and generated by a VAR.19
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With regards to the tax rates, we have chosen the values reported in Coenen et al.
(2007) that are based on OECD data. Namely, we set the consumption tax rate at 0.183
in the euro area and at 0.077 in the US, while labor income tax equals 0.24 in the euro area
and 0.22 in the US. Furthermore, the share of government spending in GDP is assumed
to equal 20 percent in both regions. The subsidy to ﬁrms (τf) is set to zero in the steady
state.
The calibrated standard deviations of the shocks are shown in Table 1, while Table
2 compares some of the moments generated by the model with the data for the euro
area and the United States. The calibrated model gets the relative standard deviations
of real GDP and its components more or less right. However, the standard deviation of
inﬂation generated by the model is too low (a bit more than half of that in the data). Also
the volatility of the real exchange rate is too low in spite of the addition of uncovered-
interest-rate-parity shocks. Importantly for our purposes, the correlation of real GDP,
consumption and investment across the two regions is captured quite well. This is partly
due to our assumption that productivity shocks have spillover eﬀects across countries (the
coeﬃcient of correlation of the two shocks is about 0.74). As highlighted by Justiniano and
Preston (2006), open-economy DSGE models have diﬃculties explaining the comovement
of business cycles in the absence of a common component in the underlying shocks. The
model captures the negative correlation between GDP and net trade, although it is less
than in the data.
Finally, as the source of the shocks is a potentially important determinant of the
gains from cooperation, we also make sure that the contributions of the various shocks
to the variance of the core macro-variables is reasonable. Tables 3 and 4 report the
variance decomposition for the euro area and the United States respectively. In line with
estimated closed-economy models, we observe that technology and labor supply shocks
are the most important drivers of output in the long run.5 Investment and preference
shocks are important sources of variation of investment and consumption respectively,
but have only a signiﬁcant short to medium-run contribution to the variance of output.
In both regions, the mark-up shocks in the domestic intermediate goods sector are the
most important drivers of inﬂation, followed by technology shocks. The only shocks that
have a non-negligible impact on the variance decomposition of foreign output are the
technology shocks. This is a result of the assumption that domestic technology shocks
have spill-over eﬀects on foreign productivity as in Backus et al. (1994).
4 Deﬁnition of the monetary policy game
The open economy dimension of our model gives rise to an international dimension of
monetary policy. While we have used an empirical monetary policy reaction function
5See, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007).20
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to calibrate the two-region model, for the analysis of the gains from cooperation in the
next section, we consider two concepts of equilibrium in the game played by the two
central banks.6 In the cooperative equilibrium, both central banks commit to implement-
ing monetary policies that maximize the joint welfare of the euro area and the United
States. The joint welfare is a population-weighted sum of the utility of the representa-
tive households in both economies. If we denote the aggregate welfare function of each
country by Wi




t +( 1− s)WUS
t .
In contrast, in the non-cooperative equilibrium, each central bank maximizes the ag-
gregate welfare function of its own country taking as given the entire path of the foreign
central bank’s instrument. This corresponds to an open-loop Nash equilibrium (Blake and
Westaway, 1995).7 The non-cooperative equilibrium that emerges from the strategic game
played by the central banks depends crucially on the instrument chosen by the two players,
as discussed in Canzoneri and Henderson (1989), Henderson and Zhu (1990), Turnovsky
and d’Orey (1989) and more recently in Lombardo and Sutherland (2006), among oth-
ers.8 It is well known that changing the strategy space (i.e. selecting diﬀerent instrument
variables) can give rise to diﬀerent Nash equilibria. The current literature on this subject
displays a variety of approaches.9 For example, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) consider feed-
back money supply rules, while Benigno and Benigno (2006) deﬁne the strategies in terms
of the inﬂation rate of the domestic GDP deﬂators. In this paper, we assume that the
central bank is able to control the money supply and we deﬁne the strategy space of the
non-cooperative equilibrium in terms of the growth rate of nominal money balances. The
6Given the dimension of our model, we were forced to neglect optimal ﬁscal policy issues. Obviously, a
complete normative analysis of optimal policies should take into account all available policy instruments. See
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) for a discussion of the global dimension of ﬁscal and monetary policy in a
micro-founded stylized two-period two-country model. Beetsma and Jensen (2005) discuss the monetary-ﬁscal
interaction in a monetary union in a dynamic two-country model.
7The open-loop Nash equilibrium implies that each central bank chooses the optimal allocation taking as
given the current and future choices of instrument by the foreign central bank (Blake and Westaway, 1995). The
alternative Nash equilibrium would be a closed-loop equilibrium “for which the sequence of foreign instruments
is known to be dependent on (some of the) other system variables” (Levine et al. (2006)). Benigno and
Benigno (2006), Levine et al. (2006) and Clarida et al. (2002) discuss open-loop equilibria. Feedback-loop (i.e.
closed-loop) Nash equilibria have been studied in small models by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), Lombardo and
Sutherland (2004). In these models, as in most of the older literature the distinction between open-loop and
closed-loop is irrelevant as the models are essentially static (with pre-set prices). See Canzoneri and Henderson
(1992) for examples of strategic set-ups in older models.
8The diﬀerent equilibrium allocation brought about by a Bertrand equilibrium as compared to, say, a Cournot
equilibrium, exempliﬁes the eﬀect that the choice of alternative instruments might have on the outcome.
9The older literature on this subject focused more closely on the classical monetary policy instruments, i.e.
money supply or interest rates (see Canzoneri and Henderson (1989)). Rogoﬀ (1985) discusses a special case in
which taking the price of domestic goods as the strategic instrument is equivalent to using money supply. In
general, though, this is not the case.21
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alternative option of choosing the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument does not
deliver saddle-path stable equilibria in the open-loop Nash game (Blake and Westaway,
1995), and therefore would produce a much inferior welfare outcome (at least locally).10
For the sake of comparison with the literature, in Section 5.5 below we also brieﬂy con-
sider open-loop Nash equilibria in which CPI and PPI inﬂation is chosen as the strategic
policy variable. However, given that the central bank has a well-deﬁned objective function
which includes other variables than inﬂation, we think that these alternative assumptions
regarding the strategy space are unwarranted in our model set-up. We prefer to use the
central bank’s instrument (money supply) as our benchmark case. Nevertheless, it is
worth emphasizing again that the size of the gains from cooperation depend, in general,
on the particular deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium considered.
A brief description of the solution method is given in the Appendix.
5 The gains from cooperation: results
In the next section we report the welfare loss due to non-cooperation (i.e. the diﬀerence
between welfare under cooperation and welfare under non-cooperation) in terms of the
amount of consumption that the typical household would need to give up in order to incur
the same loss in a deterministic world.11
5.1 Welfare decomposition: baseline results
Table 5 presents our baseline results. The ﬁrst two lines report the decomposition of the
gains from monetary policy cooperation in the euro area and the United States (i.e. the
diﬀerence in welfare between the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium) into the
diﬀerent contributions of the shocks. Furthermore, the table also shows the diﬀerence
between the conditional mean and variance of consumption, labor, real GDP, inﬂation
and the terms of trade in the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium, as well as the
contribution of each of the shocks to these diﬀerences. The ﬁrst two variables, consump-
tion and labor, are of interest as they are the primitive arguments of the welfare function.
Real GDP and inﬂation are of interest as they are often used in describing the objective
function of central banks. In particular, in ﬁrst-generation models of monetary policy
cooperation inﬂation and output volatility were often used as the sole arguments of the
10The equilibrium produced under such a game is locally explosive. One should note that when a central bank
chooses the optimal allocation taking as given the foreign interest rate, a locally indeterminate equilibrium would
emerge. We conjecture that the central bank would choose a best response to the exogenously given foreign
rate such that a saddle-path equilibrium is re-established. When two such strategies are combined together,
they would produce too many unstable roots.
11Denote ΔW as the welfare gap produced by following two diﬀerent monetary policies in a stochastic world.
We then solve for λ such that ΔW =( 1− β)
−1 {U ((1 − λ)Css) − U (Css)}22
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central bank’s objective function.12 Moreover, inﬂation and output volatility may capture
the cost from ineﬃcient goods production due to staggered nominal prices. Finally, the
terms of trade is a crucial variable in the strategic interaction between the two central
banks. The welfare gains of cooperation (Et0[WelfEA]a n dEt0[WelfUS]) are expressed
in permanent steady-state consumption units (percentages). The other variables are ex-
pressed as percentage of their steady-state value. The ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports the
values for the baseline calibration. The other columns display the values for each type of
shock separately. Except for the conditional mean of welfare, the ﬁrst column is the sum
of all the subsequent columns. For welfare the sum is not identically equal to the ﬁrst
column due to the transformation in consumption units. For each single shock, the values
that have a diﬀerent sign from that obtained under all shocks have been underlined.
Based on Table 5 a number of observations are worth highlighting. First of all, the
ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows that the overall gains from cooperation are quite modest,
thereby conﬁrming much of the recent literature. For both countries they amount to about
0.03% of steady-state consumption. This value is about one order of magnitude larger
than the values suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) and within the range of values
discussed by Benigno (2001).13 For the sake of concreteness, making average pro-capita
consumption equal to $28,000 per year, the gains from cooperation would amount to a
mere $8.4 per year per head.
In spite of a number of cross-country asymmetries imposed in the calibration, the gains
from cooperation are quite similar in both areas. Besides the diﬀerences in some of the
values of the parameters and standard deviations, an important source of asymmetry is
the fact that only dollar-denominated bonds issued by the US are assumed to be traded
internationally. This assumption implies that the euro area has an advantage over the
US in terms of increased risk-hedging options (e.g. Devereux and Sutherland (2006)).
Abstracting from the foreign-asset-return premium, for the US internationally traded
bonds provide the same return as domestically traded bonds. It should be noted that the
asymmetry discussed here captures only one aspect of the issues related with the currency
denomination of foreign assets. Another aspect would emerge had we assumed a non-zero
initial (steady-state) net foreign-asset position. In this case there would be a ﬁrst-order
eﬀect of inﬂation on real income, as discussed by Benigno (2001). As we will show below,
12E.g. Rogoﬀ (1985), Canzoneri and Gray (1985) and Sachs (1983), on the second point and Woodford (2003)
on the ﬁrst point.
13Oudiz and Sachs (1984), using large-scale multicountry econometric models, came to the conclusion that
a coordinated expansion in the face of a global shock, like an oil-price shock of the magnitude seen in the
1970s, would increase US GNP by about 0.5% “...[for] the next few years”. Their results, as those of all the
ﬁrst generation literature on this topic, are based on rather diﬀerent mechanisms than those highlighted by
the current-generation literature. In the new literature, certainty equivalence is not imposed so that “... the
monetary policy rule does aﬀect the expected trajectory of the economy via agents’ responses to risk” (Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2002)).23
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the results of broadly symmetric gains across the euro area and the United States does
not appear to be very robust as we change some of the parameters.
Turning to some of the key variables in the welfare calculations such as consumption
and labor, it is clear from the ﬁrst column in Table 5 that the gains in welfare come mostly
from an increase in the average level of consumption by between 0.04 and 0.05 percent.
This gain is partly oﬀset by the fact that both euro area and US households work more in
the cooperative equilibrium. As a result, average GDP increases by 0.1 percent in the euro
area and 0.07 percent in the United States. Overall, the volatility of the main variables
is lower under cooperation, but generally by not much. Turning to inﬂation, inﬂation is
on average lower in the cooperative equilibrium (by 0.07 and 0.05 percent respectively in
the euro area and the United States). In other words, lack of cooperation leads to a small
inﬂationary bias. On the other hand, cooperation leads to a small improvement of the
terms of trade of the euro area by 0.05 percent.
A second important observation from Table 5 is that the most important source of
gains from cooperation are the mark-up shocks. In our model, all shocks produce pol-
icy trade-oﬀs due to the large number of ineﬃciencies (incomplete markets, monopolistic
competition, distortionary taxes, sticky wages, sticky prices and imperfect exchange rate
pass-through). As a result, cooperation is always better than non-cooperation in response
to all of the shocks. However, as argued by Benigno and Benigno (2006), some shocks
produce larger incentives for the central banks to move the relative price to their own
advantage. This is particularly true for mark-up shocks. This is conﬁrmed by the anal-
ysis in Table 5. The mark-up shocks explain more than three fourths of the gains from
cooperation. From the variance decomposition in Tables 3 and 4, we know that mark-up
shocks are also the single largest source of inﬂation volatility, while they account only for
a modest share of the volatility of the real variables. In contrast, although productivity
shocks play the major role in explaining the volatility in real activity of the euro area
and US economies, they don’t generate wide discrepancies between the cooperative and
the non-cooperative allocations in terms of welfare. Similarly, the contribution of all the
other shocks to the gains from cooperation is an order of magnitude smaller than those
of the mark-up shocks.
As argued by Canzoneri et al. (2002), the gains from cooperation are increasing in the
size of the policy trade-oﬀs generated by the shocks. Shocks that can be easily oﬀ-set by
a self-oriented central bank do not produce international conﬂicts of interests. In that
case, cooperation would not be welfare improving as also argued by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2002). In contrast, shocks that produce large trade-oﬀs generate strong incentives for the
self-oriented central banks to export some of the costs to the other country. When both
central banks pursue “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, the net result will be a deterioration
of global welfare. Cooperation, in this case, will be welfare improving.
Figures 1 and 2 compare the response of the euro area and US economy to a mark-up
shock and a productivity shock, respectively, under the cooperative and non-cooperative24
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equilibrium and the calibrated monetary policy reaction function. Under the cooperative
equilibrium, a positive euro area mark-up shock has the usual negative impact on output
and consumption in the euro area. Moreover, in order to stabilize inﬂation, the nominal
interest rate increases and the terms of trade appreciate (although only marginally). More
interestingly, the euro area mark-up shock generates positive comovement between euro
area and US GDP. In both countries inﬂation rises and the real wage falls.
The latter is in contrast with the impulse responses under the optimal cooperative
policy derived by Benigno and Benigno (2006). In their much simpler open-economy model
which only incorporates monopolistic competition and sticky prices, a domestic mark-up
shock generates negative comovement between economic activity in both countries. As
discussed by Benigno and Benigno (2006), in their simple model the crucial determinant
of the sign of the international spillovers is the relative size of the intratemporal and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the intratemporal elasticity dominates, home
and foreign goods are substitutes in the utility function (Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)). In
this case a foreign deterioration of the terms of trade will bring about a foreign expansion
of production. In contrast, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution dominates, the
two goods are complements and both home and foreign production will contract.
These two parameters, though, are insuﬃcient to describe the relative response of home
and foreign output if capital accumulation is introduced in the model. In our model, as
it would happen in the Benigno and Benigno (2006) setup cum capital accumulation, the
spillovers are positive under the optimal cooperative policy, at least on impact.
Qualitatively, the responses under the optimal cooperative policy are very similar to
those under the calibrated monetary policy reaction functions. The discrepancy with
the non-cooperative policies is, however, quite large. The short-term interest rates and
the terms of trade respond in a much more volatile fashion and this is reﬂected in a more
volatile response of consumption and GDP. It is also clear that the initial response of GDP
is negative in the euro area, but positive in the US as the euro area monetary authorities
attempt to export some of the volatility in the labor costs to the foreign country.
A quite diﬀerent picture is obtained in Figure 2 regarding the eﬀects of a productivity
shock. In this case, the impulse responses under the cooperative and non-cooperative
equilibrium are quite similar, conﬁrming the limited contribution of those shocks to the
gains from cooperation. These impulse responses are also quite similar to those under
the calibrated policy rule. As is to be expected, following a temporary positive produc-
tivity shock in both countries, consumption, output and wages rise persistently, while
nominal interest rates and inﬂation fall. The domestic terms of trade deteriorate as the
productivity shock increases relative supply of the domestic goods.
As mentioned earlier, the single most important shock in accounting for the gains from
cooperation (i.e. summing up the EA and US welfare gains) is the mark-up shock. We
should expect that the randomness in the home mark-up will partially spill-over to the
volatility of the home ﬁrms’ optimal price. The home domestic-price index is a concave25
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function of individual prices. This implies that the expected home domestic-price index
is lower than its non-stochastic value. This is true also when we measure the expected
home domestic-price index relative to the CPI index. The lower expected price implies
a higher expected demand and, ceteris paribus, lower expected average proﬁts, as ﬁrms
expect, on average, to be oﬀ their supply curve. The expected foreign domestic-price
index, relative to the CPI, will be higher, as the CPI is partially aﬀected by the drop in
the home domestic-price index. Therefore, demand is expected to switch partially from
the foreign goods to the home goods. Whether this eﬀect is welfare increasing or not will
likely depend on the net increase in consumption and labor eﬀort.14 Each central bank,
taken in isolation, will try to increase consumption while reducing labor eﬀort.15 The
policy makers would attempt to do this by aﬀecting the (expected) terms of trade. When
both banks act in this way, the net result will be a deterioration of welfare compared to
the cooperative equilibrium.
5.2 Degree of openness
It is natural to expect that the gains from cooperation would be higher the higher the
economic integration of the countries involved. Quoting Oudiz and Sachs (1984, p.5-6)
“... the direct eﬀects of commodity trade on macroeconomic interdependence remain
surprisingly small; at the core, it is these relatively small trade links that condition our
conclusions regarding the returns to coordination”. These authors were talking about
export and import shares to GNP between the European Community and the US (1982)
of between 1.4 and 2.2 percent. While these numbers have increased somewhat since
then, they remain relatively small. Our calibration implies that, in the non-stochastic
steady state, US exports to the EA are about 8% of US GDP while US imports from
the EA are about 11% of US GDP. EA exports to the US are about 14% of EA GDP,
while EA imports from the US are about 11% of EA GDP. Table 7 shows the polar
case of equal sized countries and no home bias. Although this assumption might look
extreme if compared with our benchmark parametrization, the variance decomposition of
shocks and the moments (standard deviations and cross-correlations) of the model are not
dramatically diﬀerent from those obtained in our benchmark calibration. Nevertheless,
the gains from coordination, absent home bias, are huge. They reach 21.5% for the EA
and 25.3% for the US. Almost all of these gains are due to mark-up volatility.
Table 7 also oﬀers an intermediate case, where the trade shares have been increased
to about 32% of GDP in both countries (equal size and home-bias parameter set to 0.65).
14That welfare could be higher in the stochastic equilibrium as compared to the non-stochastic equilibrium
is a well known fact in economics. Cho and Cooley (2003) oﬀer a recent discussion of this result.
15Using a simple two-country model ` a la Benigno and Benigno (2006), we can see that the optimizing (co-
operative) central bank will try to increase consumption and labor more under an ineﬃcient steady state than
under an eﬃcient steady state.26
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In this case the welfare gains are almost two orders of magnitude larger than in the
benchmark calibration, reaching about 0.74% of steady-state consumption in the EA and
about 1.0% of steady-state consumption for the US.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis with respect to nominal rigidities
While Table 5 shows the results for the calibrated (benchmark) model, Tables 6 and 7
report the results from a sensitivity analysis. We report in each case the overall gain
in welfare and its various components, as well as the contribution of the euro area and
US mark-up shock and the sum of the other shocks in each region. Also in these cases,
the mark-up shocks are by far the most important contributors to the welfare gains. In
interpreting many of these exercises, it is important to realize that the size of the welfare
losses in general ceases to have a solid empirical basis. For example, imposing ﬂexible
prices, while maintaining all other parameters unchanged, gives the mark-up shocks a
disproportionate eﬀect on output.16 These results, therefore, should only be taken as
indicative of the sensitivity of the welfare losses to some of the parameters of the model.
Deriving empirically sound conﬁdence bands for the welfare losses would require a more
complex approach that is beyond the scope of the present work and that we leave for
future research.17
We ﬁrst investigate the role of indexation in the intermediate-goods sector (Table 6 ).
The table shows that without indexation, the gains from cooperation rise only marginally
from about 0.05 to 0.09 percent of steady-state consumption. However, the cross-country
“spillover eﬀects” change sign: i.e. while euro area welfare gains increase in their own
mark-up shock and decrease in the US mark-up shock, the reverse happens in the foreign
country. In other words, according to these results the EA would be better oﬀ not to
adopt the cooperative policy if there were only US mark-up shocks. Turning to the
degree of price stickiness in the intermediate-goods sector itself, Table 6 shows the eﬀect
of reducing price stickiness by half in the intermediate-goods sector. Higher ﬂexibility in
the intermediate-goods sector increases the gains from cooperation quite drastically. In
particular, halving the Calvo probability leads to welfare gains of 10 and 17 percent. As
mentioned earlier, this result should be interpreted with particular caution, as reducing
the degree of price rigidity increases the weight of mark-up volatility in the volatility of
the whole economy beyond what we observe in the data.
It is also of particular interest to study the role of the incomplete pass-through of the
16For example, the terms of trade would have a standard deviation about seven times larger than in the
data. EA and US GDP volatility would be twice as large as in the data, while they would be negatively cross-
correlated. A number of other moments would be strongly altered. Finally, mark-up shocks would explain
between 54% (EA) and 45% (US) of the volatility of GDP (at 12 quarters).
17In this regard the ranges suggested by Benigno (2001) should also be taken with a grain of salt, as they
derive from varying some parameters without discussion of the implications for the empirical ﬁt of the model.27
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exchange rate in generating gains from cooperation. In Table 6, the degree of pass-through
was increased by assuming that retail prices of imported goods are twice as ﬂexible as
in the benchmark model. A higher pass-through marginally reduces the overall gains
from cooperation. However, under this assumption domestic mark-up shocks reduce the
domestic welfare gains while they improve the foreign welfare gains.18 Notice, furthermore,
that the welfare gains associated with mark-up shocks cease to be symmetric. Table 6
shows what happens if import prices are not indexed to domestic CPI inﬂation. The sign
of the contribution of mark-up shocks to the gain from cooperation is the same as in the
previous case. In this case, though, symmetry is preserved.
Finally, we also had a look at the impact of changes in nominal wage rigidity and wage
indexation. Somewhat surprisingly, those nominal rigidities do not seem to have a large
impact on the gains from cooperation.
5.4 Some other critical parameters
In this section, we discuss the implications of diﬀerences in some of the other parameters
of our model that have received particular attention in the international monetary policy
cooperation literature.
Inter- and intra-temporal elasticity of substitution Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)
show that the cross-country spill-over eﬀect of monetary policy crucially depends on the
size of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution relative to the intra-temporal elasticity
(i.e. the elasticity of substitution between imported goods and domestically produced
goods). With CES goods aggregators and CRRA utility function, the sign of the cross
derivative of the utility function with respect to the domestically produced bundle of
goods and the imported bundle of goods depends on the size of the intra-temporal elas-
ticity of substitution relative to the size of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. If
the former is larger than the latter, the two bundles are substitutes, if smaller, they are
complements. If they have the same size, the consumption spill-overs are nil. Neverthe-
less, even in the latter case, policy spill-overs could still be present if monetary policy can
aﬀect the international distribution of labor eﬀort. So, for example, an improvement of
the terms of trade would tend to export labor eﬀort abroad. While the extent of this eﬀect
increases in the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution, the income gains decrease in this
elasticity: In the spirit of the “optimum tariﬀ” argument, the lower is the intra-temporal
18For the sake of comparison, we ran a similar experiment on the simple two-country model ` al aB e n i g n o
and Benigno (2006). This simple model would predict that domestic mark-up shocks are detrimental for
domestic welfare gains from cooperation and beneﬁcial for the foreign gains. This result is strongly sensitive
to whether wages are ﬂexible or not and to whether international ﬁnancial markets are complete or not. The
model-dependence of these results makes a generalization of them nearly impossible.28
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elasticity of substitution, the larger the monopolistic rent that the country can extract
internationally.
Table 7 shows the welfare-decomposition results for diﬀerent values of the inter- and
intra-temporal elasticity of substitution. The main result of our paper remains unchanged:
the gains from cooperation are very modest.
A more detailed look at the results shows that the gains from cooperation seem to
decrease in the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution (Table 7).19
Market completeness In Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) the cooperative central banks
face a trade-oﬀ between stabilization and increased tradable-consumption risk sharing.20
This holds true also in our benchmark calibration, although the trade-oﬀ is more complex
involving a larger number of margins.
Increasing the degree of consumption risk sharing is welfare improving. Nevertheless,
without cooperation risk sharing cannot be achieved. This fact, per se, will generate a
gap between the cooperative and non-cooperative allocations.
Table 7 reports the results of our decomposition of the welfare gains from cooperation
when international ﬁnancial markets are complete. Now the gains from cooperation are
about one order of magnitude smaller than in the benchmark calibration. In the same table
we show that a sizable reduction of the gains from cooperation is obtained by introducing
market completeness in a model with larger trade shares.
5.5 Alternative assumptions regarding the non-cooperative
strategy space
Benigno and Benigno (2006) deﬁne the strategy space of the Nash game in terms of the
growth rate of the GDP deﬂator. In our model, we don’t see any reason to assume that
each central bank should take (any measure of) foreign inﬂation as given when solving
its non-cooperative policy problem. On the contrary, in the context of an open-loop non-
cooperative game, it sounds more reasonable to us to think that each central bank must
take as given the choices of the other central bank regarding either the quantity or the
price that clears the market in which the other central bank is active. Nevertheless, for the
sake of comparison we computed the non-cooperative equilibrium under two alternative
speciﬁcations of the strategy space: in terms of the PPI inﬂation rates and in terms of
the CPI inﬂation rates.
19Benigno (2001) shows that the gains are not monotonic in the intra-temporal elasticity. We have considered
also values of 2, 4, and 6 for the intra-temporal elasticity conﬁrming that in this range the welfare gains seem
to be lower the larger this elasticity.
20In their model the risk sharing motive is absent when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unitary.29
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The Nash equilibrium brought about by the PPI inﬂation rates, in the benchmark
calibration, is indeterminate, so that we should conclude that the gains from cooperation,
in this case, are potentially huge.
In contrast, the Nash equilibrium brought about by the CPI inﬂation rates is saddle-
path stable, in the benchmark calibration. The gains from cooperation in this case are
larger than those obtained when solving the game in terms of the money supplies. In
particular the gains from cooperation would be 0.32% for the euro area and 0.28% for
the US. Compared with the results reported in Table 5, the gains are now one order of
magnitude larger.
6 Performance of simple rules
Monetary policy is often described in terms of interest rate feed-back rules of the type
used in our calibration. Studying the gains from cooperation when central banks opti-
mally choose the parameters of such feedback rules is not the main focus of our paper.
Nevertheless, in order to gain a sense of how our results would change if the policy problem
is described in terms of particular interest rate rules, we have carried out two experiments.
In the ﬁrst each central bank maximizes its objective function by choosing the coeﬃcients
of an inertial interest rate rule that responds to CPI inﬂation and real GDP, where the
degree of inertia is the same as in the calibrated rule. This rule amounts to an inertial
Taylor-rule (Taylor, 1993). This experiment shows that in both the cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibrium the central banks don’t want to respond to output. This result is
similar to the ﬁndings of Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007a,b), in a closed-economy setting.
The reason, we conjecture, is that the measure of output used in the model is the actual
deviation of output from the steady state. The result would likely diﬀer had we used the
deviation of output from its eﬃcient ﬂexible-price-and-wage level.
The second experiment assumes that the (inertial) interest rate rule responds to CPI
inﬂation and wage inﬂation.21 This rule is dictated by the results shown in Levin et al.
(2006) that the optimal interest rate rule in a closed economy with wage and price stick-
iness attributes a large weight to wage inﬂation. This experiment shows that both the
cooperative and the non-cooperative central banks prefer to respond only to wage in-
ﬂation.22 In what follows, we therefore consider a closed-loop Nash game in the simple
inertial wage-inﬂation interest-rate rules.
Figure 3 summarizes the results. The graph shows the contour plot of the EA and US
21Output is omitted on the basis of the result of the ﬁrst experiment and so easing the computational burden.
22The search of the optimal response coeﬃcients has been done by imposing a grid for each parameter. The
step size and the range of these grids has been adjusted in order to reﬁne the results to a convincing degree.
Given this procedure we cannot exclude that the optimal rule requires to respond to CPI inﬂation and GDP
with very small coeﬃcients. Given the purpose of our experiments we treat these small numbers as zero.30
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welfare functions (in utility units) in deviation from the steady state value when the share
of import (and export) in GDP is increased to about 32%.23 The ﬁgure is reminiscent
of the graphical analysis used by Hamada (1976) to derive the non-cooperative equilibria
in his monetary policy game. On the horizontal axis we have the EA response coeﬃcient
to wage inﬂation, while on the vertical axis we have the US response coeﬃcient. The
straight lines crossing the contours represent the reaction functions of each central bank
to the other bank’s choice of reaction coeﬃcient. As explained by Hamada (1976), the
reaction function of the EA passes through the point of tangency of each EA contour with
horizontal lines. The reaction function of the US passes through the point of tangency
of each US contour with vertical lines. The ﬁrst interesting result is that the reaction
functions are perpendicular: the Nash equilibrium involves strictly dominant strategies.
This result suggests that, for the strategy space considered here, there is no monetary
policy interdependence, although there are international monetary policy spillovers. The
second interesting result is that the Nash equilibriuim (denoted by N in the graph) diﬀers
from the cooperative equilibrium (denoted by C in the graph): the Nash equilibrium
implies a weaker response to wage inﬂation than the cooperative equilibrium.
For the game described in Figure 3 the gains from cooperation amount to 0.0013% for
the EA and 0.0021% for the US (in consumption units). While these numbers are smaller
than those presented in Table 7 for the same degree of openness but under the open-loop
Nash equilibrium, one should notice that the level of welfare obtained under cooperation
with this simple rule is lower than that obtained under the Ramsey cooperative allocation.
The diﬀerence between the former and the latter amounts to −0.4289% for the EA and
0.2287% for the US, making the simple rule suboptimal from the global point of view.
These experiments also conﬁrm that under the benchmark model, i.e. with a smaller
degree of openness, the gains from cooperation are smaller, amounting to 0.00008% for
the EA and −0.00003% for the US.
Finally, Table 8 shows that the loss incurred in adopting the calibrated rule as opposed
to the (Ramsey) optimal cooperative policy are not very large. Levin et al. (2006) in a
closed economy model estimated with US data, ﬁnd that the loss incurred by adopting
the estimated simple interest rate rule as opposed to the optimal policy, implies a welfare
cost of about 0.56% of steady-state consumption. We ﬁnd a welfare cost that is about
ﬁve times smaller.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed the gains from monetary policy cooperation in a quan-
titative two-region DSGE model for the euro area and the United States. A number
of recent papers have revived the debate about the gains from international monetary
23We consider this case because it makes the graphical analysis more visible.31
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policy cooperation. None of these, nevertheless, has used large-scale DSGE models to
quantify the gains from cooperation. Our paper is a ﬁrst attempt to ﬁll this gap. Our
analysis shows that the gains from cooperation are very sensitive to the degree of open-
ness of the economies. Given the current degree of openness of the US and euro area
economies, and in line with the recent literature, we ﬁnd that the gains from cooperation
are small. They amount to about 0.03 percent of steady-state consumption. This is an
order of magnitude higher than the gains suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), but
nevertheless very small. Nevertheless, as we incease the degree of openness from 10-15
percent to about 32 percent, the gains from cooperation rise to a sizable level, i.e. about
1 percent of steady-state consumption. Our analysis, therefore, suggests that the recent
trends in international economic integration will be accompanied by larger gains from
policy cooperation.
Our analysis also shows that mark-up shocks are the most important source of gains
from international monetary policy cooperation. A deeper understanding of the sources
of these type of disturbances will therefore be crucial for gauging the need for closer
cooperation in the future.
There are various potentially fruitful avenues for further research. First, in the absence
of a fully estimated two-region version of the NAWM, we have used a calibrated version
of the model. Performing the same analysis on an estimated model would be useful in
providing a benchmark for performing robustness and sensitivity analysis. In particular,
one could use the posterior distribution of the model to calculate the empirically relevant
range of the gains from cooperation given the structure of the economy. Second, we have
focused on price mark-up shocks as the only ineﬃcient sources of variation in the dynamics
of the economy (with the exception of the exchange rate shocks). A full empirical analysis
should also investigate the impact of mark-up shocks in the labor market and the imported
goods sector. Third, we have focused our analysis of the non-cooperative equilibrium to an
open-loop Nash equilibrium where the monetary policy instruments are deﬁned in terms
of nominal money growth rates. An alternative and possibly more plausible game is one
where each monetary authority takes the reaction function of the foreign central bank as
given.
In Section 6 we have taken a ﬁrst step in that direction analyzing closed-loop Nash
equilibria in a few simple feedback rules. The results conﬁrm our ﬁndings that in the
benchmark case the gains from cooperation are small but increasing in the degree of trade
integration. However, a more complete analysis using more complicated feedback rules
is warranted. Fourth, the importance of mark-up shocks for the gains from cooperation
raises questions about the micro-foundations of those shocks. A deeper theory of why
prices are sticky and what are the sources of the high-frequency variation in some prices
would be important to gain more conﬁdence in the welfare implications of such mark-up
shocks.32
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Appendix
Description of the solution method
The cooperative and non-cooperative (open-loop Nash) non-linear ﬁrst-order conditions of
the policymakers’ problem were derived using our Matlab code (compatible with DYNARE
(Juillard, 1996)). This code (“Lq-solution”) is available from the authors on request. The
derivation of the policy makers’ ﬁrst order conditions is based on Benigno and Woodford
(2006).
As money is neutral in the steady state of our model, the solution of the steady state
value of the endogenous variables is independent of the solution of the steady-state value
of the Lagrange multipliers of the policy problem. The steady state of the structural
equations was solved using a suite of non-linear solvers (SolvOpt, by Kuntsevich and
Kappel (1997), SA (simulated annealing) by Goﬀe (1996) and Matlab’s fsolve with use of
the analytical Jacobian of the model). The steady-state value of the Lagrange multipliers
is then obtained by solving a least-squares problem.
The (ﬁrst- and second-order accurate) state-space solution of the model (under the
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of monetary policy) was then obtained using Dynare (version 4).
The conditional moments were constructed by iterating the ﬁrst- and second-order
accurate state-space solutions returned by Dynare.
For the calibration exercise we used a combination of Dynare output and our own
Matlab codes (including HP ﬁltering).33
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Table 1: Standard Deviation of the Shocks
Preference Shock Home 0.018
Preference Shock Foreign 0.018
Investment Home 0.044
Investment Foreign 0.009
Monetary Policy Home 0.002





Labor Supply Foreign 0.07
Labor Supply Home 0.06
UIP 0.01
Table 2: Stylized Facts of the Model
Euro Area US
Standard Deviation Model Data Model Data Model Data
GDP 0.89 0.93 1.01 1.02
Consumption 0.59 0.80 0.76 0.90
Investment 2.56 2.60 3.71 4.9
Inﬂation 0.53 1.05 0.57 1.20
Real Exchange Rate 1.98 7.00
Net Trade 0.26 0.46




Cross Correlation within Countries
GDP-Net Trade -0.28 -0.69 -0.47 -0.39
Consumption -Net Trade -0.19 -0.75 -0.17 -0.45
Investment - Net Trade -0.23 -0.79 -0.39 -0.51
Tables and figures34
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition
Euro Area
Output Consumption Investment Inﬂation REX
Euro Area Shocks
Technology 55.4 26.3 41.1 27.4 11.6
Labor Supply 19.5 6.79 15.7 8.03 9.43
Investment 0.93 0.75 6.06 0.14 0.36
Preferences 2.78 51.7 19.5 4.14 8.38
Mark-up 5.68 1.39 1.86 52.8 7.55
Monetary Policy 1.00 0.41 0.57 1.63 4.48
US Shocks
Technology 14.4 10.9 11.1 4.69 6.79
Labor Supply 0.12 0.35 0.28 0.10 10.5
Investment 0.09 0.84 2.93 0.55 6.65
Preferences 0.06 0.28 0.44 0.19 4.06
Mark-up 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.17 9.02
Monetary Policy 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.06 6.69
UIP 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.03 14.5
Table 4: Variance Decomposition
United States
Output Consumption Investment Inﬂation
Euro Area Shocks
Technology 11.2 10.0 6.38 4.02
Labor Supply 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.03
Investment 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01
Preferences 0.04 0.33 0.17 0.11
Mark-up 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07
Monetary Policy 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
US Shocks
Technology 46.8 27.4 26.9 25.0
Labor Supply 22.6 9.78 13.9 9.65
Investment 9.81 11.5 42.7 2.62
Preferences 2.36 38.4 7.05 2.77
Mark-up 5.34 1.51 1.73 53.1
Monetary Policy 1.71 0.80 0.83 2.57
UIP 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.0335
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Table 6: Welfare Decomposition: Nominal rigidities and in-
dexation




Lower price rigidity in intermediate-goods sector (Calvo pr. = 0.35)
Et0[WelfEA] 10.9639 6.1409 5.397 0.1241 0.1271
Et0[WelfUS] 18.0099 8.2732 11.0678 0.2592 0.2412
Higher exchange-rate pass through (Calvo pr. = 0.35)
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0353 -0.011 0.0456 0.0003 0.0004
Et0[WelfUS] -0.0001 0.0251 -0.0266 0.0011 0.0003
Lower wage rigidity (Calvo pr. = 0.35)
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0181 0.0078 0.0022 0.004 0.0041
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0207 0.0046 0.0093 0.004 0.0028
No indexation of prices in intermediate-goods sector
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0376 0.051 -0.0236 0.0058 0.0045
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0549 -0.0217 0.0629 0.008 0.0058
No indexation of import prices
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0438 -0.0115 0.0486 0.0034 0.0033
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0433 0.0487 -0.0136 0.0053 0.003
No indexation of wages
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0271 0.0152 0.0052 0.004 0.0028
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0294 0.0058 0.0149 0.0053 0.0034
Table 7: Welfare Decomposition: Further sensitivity analysis




Unitary intra-temporal elasticity of substitution
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0086 0.0061 -0.0009 0.0017 0.0018
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0065 -0.001 0.0052 0.0015 0.0007
Higher intra-temporal elasticity of substitution (1.7)
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0031 0.0013 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0037 0.0007 0.0016 0.0009 0.0005
Equal intra- and inter-temporal elasticities (0.7)
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0029 0.0031 0.0021
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0422 0.0148 0.0178 0.0074 0.0022
Equal country size and no home bias
Et0[WelfEA] 21.5074 11.2688 10.0618 3.106 1.4399
Et0[WelfUS] 24.8622 11.2348 13.0827 3.556 1.7581
Equal size and lower home bias (0.65)
Et0[WelfEA] 0.7382 0.3876 0.1818 0.1384 0.0348
Et0[WelfUS] 0.961 0.2237 0.5004 0.175 0.068
Complete markets (benchmark calibration)
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0044 0.0026 -0.0008 0.0017 0.0009
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0024 0.0005 0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0001
Complete markets, equal size and lower home bias (0.65)
Et0[WelfEA] 0.0269 0.0096 0.0158 0.0013 0.0002
Et0[WelfUS] 0.0381 0.0219 0.0136 0.0016 0.00137
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Table 8: Welfare Decomposition: Cooperative policy vs. cal-
ibrated simple rules




Et0[WelfEA] 0.1366 0.0145 0.0248 0.055 0.0424
Et0[WelfUS] 0.1067 -0.0088 -0.0161 0.0224 0.1092














































































Figure 1: EA mark-up shock: Coop. (solid), Nash (arrowed-dashed), Rule (dashed)38
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Figure 2: EA productivity shock: Coop. (solid), Nash (arrowed-dashed), Rule (dashed)39
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Figure 3: Nash and cooperative equilibria under inertial interest rate rules reacting to wage inﬂation only.40
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